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An Evaluation of Two New Inference Control
Methods
Y. H. CHIN, MEMBER, IEEE, AND WENG-LING PENG
Abstract-An evaluation method is developed to measure the cost/
effectiveness of two new inference control methods. The factors of the
evaluation function consist of: 1) preparation cost for the control
method, 2) query complexity, and 3) security level under various at-
tacks. Each control method combines the merit of some popular con-
cepts; the first method is based on restriction, and the second on per-
turbation. Simulation results indicate that both methods have higher
preparation cost, better security, and faster response time than Cox's
method and Beck's method. Finally these two new methods are com-
pared to each other.
In general the control methods based on restriction have higher
preparation cost and better security, and the control methods based
on perturbation have faster response time for a query, but more in-
formation leak.
Index Terms-Cell suppression, cost factors, data perturbation,
evaluation methods, inference control, partitioning, query-set-size
control, random-sample-query control, security, statistical database.
I. INTRODUCTION
1THE goal of statistical databases (SDB) is to provide
l average, count, median, total, and other statistical in-
formation on a group of records, while confidential indi-
vidual data are protected. As pointed out by Denning and
Schl6rer [17], this objective is very difficult to achieve,
since statistical data are collected from individuals; there-
fore sensitive data could be disclosed through some sta-
tistical inference. Methods of preventing inference are
usually called "inference control." There are, in general,
two approaches to control inference: restriction and per-
turbation. Many methods have been proposed in recent
years and modified. For example, inference control meth-
ods based on restriction are: 1) auditing system [8], [11],
[17], 2) cell suppression [9], [16], [17], 3) grouping [17],
4) query-set-size control [6], [12], [16], [17], 5) implied
queries control [16], [17], 6) query-set-overlap control
[12], [16], [18], [26], 7) order control [16], [17], 8) rel-
ative-table-size control (Sm/N-criterion) [16], [17], and
9) partitioning [1], [3], [5], [7], [11], [16], [17], [22],
[24], [32]. The inference control methods based on per-
turbation are: 1) data perturbation [2], [16], [17], [34], 2)
data swapping [10], [16], [17], [27], [31], 3) random-
sample-query control [11], [12], [14], [16], [17], [19],
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[35], 4) response perturbation [11], [16], [17], and 5) par-
titioning [1], [3], [5], [7], [11], [16], [17], [22], [24],
[32].
Each method has strengths and weaknesses. This paper
proposes two new methods. The first is called partial
suppression, and it combines the concepts of partition,
query-set-size control, and cell suppression control. The
second method, called PRD perturbation, combines the
concepts of partition, random-sample-query control, and
data perturbation. An evaluation method based on prep-
aration cost, query complexity and security, is designed
to evaluate the strength of each method. In Section II, the
model and database environment are introduced, while
Section III discusses the concepts of partial suppression
and PRD perturbation. The factors of the cost function
are introduced in Section IV, and Section V covers eval-
uation results. Finally, Section VI summarizes the results
learned from this work.
II. MODEL AND ENVIRONMENT
Suppose the database under consideration has one re-
lation. The relational schema has A attributes and is in the
Third Normal Form. If m attributes are indexed, and (A
- m) attributes are not indexed, then the file could be
partitioned into a number of "basic query sets" (BQS's)
with respect to these m indexed attributes. If this partition
is viewed as a multiple attribute tree (MAT) [20], [23],
there are m levels and P leaf nodes, and a BQS represents
a unique path from the root of the tree to a leaf node. The
value of P is equal to the products of val * va2 *
... * yvam l, where vaj is the number of distinct val-
ues currently existing in the domain of an indexed attri-
bute aj.
For ease of discussion, Fig. 1 shows a relational schema
and some associated tuples. Figs 2 and 3 show two dif-
ferent partition trees which were both created from the file
shown in Fig. 1.
Basically, a query is a request to a database, and con-
tains the message about required information and condi-
tions for retrieval. A retrievable condition is a qualifica-
tion expression (QE), and a QE has a number of query
sets (QS's) connected by logical operators such as AND
or OR, and a QS has one or more BQS's. For example,
the QE (SEX = F AND DEPARTMENT = A AND B-
YEAR = 1931) OR (DEGREE = BS AND SALARY
>= 20) has two QS's connected by an OR operation.
0098-5589/87/1200-1329$01.00 © 1987 IEEE
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Fig. 1. The employee relation used for discussion.
dummy root ---> 0
SEX ---> F M
DEPT ---> A D M... A D
B-YEAR --> 1931 1932 1934 1960 1931... 1944...
l l lI I I
query-set-size:l 12 3 3 4 1
Fig. 2. A partition tree of attributes: SEX, DEPARTMENT, and B-YEAR.
dummy root ---> 0
DEGREE --- > Bs MS Ph.D
B-CITY-->London Paris N.Y. Rome London Paris N.Y. Rome London...
I /\ I\
SAL --> 25 15 20 15 25 15 30
l Il l l
query-set-size:2 3 4 5 6 3 1
Fig. 3. Partrition tree of attributes: DEGREE, B-CITY, and SALARY.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the com-
plexity of a query is proportional to the number of queried
attributes in a QE. In general, the more attributes that are
specified in a QE, the more likely that confidential infor-
mation is disclosed. The query complexity not only af-
fects the degree of information leak, but also the response
time of a query. A cost function is proposed here to eval-
uate the "strength" of a protection method. The param-
eters included in this function are: 1) preparation cost, 2)
query cost, and 3) security cost.
The principles for designing new methods are 1) lower
overhead for bookkeeping operations, and 2) fewer re-
strictions on statistical queries. That is, the first criterion
is to reduce high implementation costs, and the second
one is to release the restrictions on the allowable range of
queries. As mentioned before, query complexity is an
evaluation factor, and the complexity of a query is mea-
sured by the number of BQS's involved in a QE, as was
done by Cardenas [4]. Hence a BQS is treated as a unit,
and merging or grouping concepts should be avoided as
much as possible. For example, auditing system and
query-set-overlap control are excluded because both re-
quire large amounts of historical information. Methods
based on the concepts of control and/or relative-table-size
control have been excluded, since they have more restric-
tion on statistical queries than query-set-size control [16].
Grouping [17] methods merge a number of BQS's into a
single responsive unit; therefore the semantic meaning of
a BQS (or QS) is lost if we adopt the merging or grouping
concept in our model. Similarly, the reason for excluding
the data swapping is due to high implementation cost [16],
and the reason for excluding response perturbation is its
inconsistency in response, and the potential for extreme
data [16], [17].
The first QS is a BQS, since it corresponds to a unique
path from the root node to a leaf node, as shown in Fig.
2. The second is a QS since it is a union of these BQS's
under the node DEGREE = BS, and this QS is a logical
OR along the path DEGREE -+ B-CIIY -+ SALARY as
shown in Fig. 3. When the size of a BQS is greater than
a predefined constant k, we call this query set a sufficient
query set (SQS). Otherwise it is called an insufficient
query set (IQS). For example, in Fig. 2, the BQS along
the path SEX = FAND DEPARTMENT = A AND B-YEAR
= 1931 is an IQS; and the BQS along the path SEX = F
AND DEPARTMENT = A AND B-YEAR = 1932 is an
SQS, if the k is set to 2.
Basic Concepts
Usually, a statistical query is a query expressed in
the form SF (QE, N). Here SF represents a statistical
function, and N is an attribute name to which
the statistical function is applied. For example:
SUM((DEPARTMENT=A AND B-YEAR = 1931),
SALARY) is a statistical query. This query gives the sum
of the SALARY for those employees who work in depart-
ment A, and who were born in the year 1931.
III. THE METHODS
The first method is based on the concepts of partition,
query-set-size control, and cell suppression. First, the data
of a database are partitioned into a number of BQS's, then
these BQS's are classified into a group of SQS's and a
group of IQS's. Finally, the conditions are used to deter-
mine whether an IQS shall, or shall not, be suppressed.
Conditional suppression makes this method conceptually
different from the methods based on the concepts of cell
suppression in which all IQS's or some SQS's are sup-
pressed unconditionally.
Similarly, the second method first partitions the data-
base into a set of BQS's, then uses the concept of random-
sample-query control to select samples randomly from the
SQS's. Notice that the process of selecting random sam-
ples was done before a query was submitted and executed.
This presampling technique gives a consistent answer, re-
gardless of how many times a query is submitted. There-
fore, the drawback of response-inconsistency [16] no
longer exists. When a query contains an IQS, then the
data perturbation concept is used to perturb the data in the
IQS.
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A. Partial Suppression Method
The partial suppression method combines concepts of
"partitioning," "query-set-size control," and "cell
suppression." Hence, the basic principle in the partial
suppresion method is: "partitioning" the records of a file
into a number of distinct subsets based on the domains of
some selected indexed attributes, then using "query-set-
size" to identify IQS's, and suppressing the query-set
which met some predefined conditions.
Cell suppression protects sensitive information by sup-
pressing IQS's as well as some SQS's which could be used
to deduce the IQS. Under partial suppression, the infor-
mation will still be released if some "conditions" are met;
therefore this method will release some statistical infor-
mation blocked by the cell suppression method. This fea-
ture makes partial suppression better than cell suppres-
sion. Another drawback in cell suppression methods is
that it is easily attacked by using some "related charac-
teristic functions." To prevent such attacks, an "implied-
query control" method should be added. Unfortunately,
implied-query control has a high implementation cost be-
cause all "related QE's" have to be tested if the given
QE is sensitive. Partial suppression could prevent the at-
tack by hiding some IQS's, thus attacking through related
QE's will be impossible. An intruder would have no way
to deduce the sensitive information.
To illustrate partial suppression clearly, the conditions
are first stated. Then some examples are used to illustrate
the difference between the partial suppression method, and
other "conventional" methods such as these based on cell
suppression or implied-query control.
Conditions:
1) When a QE has either m indexed attributes, or (m
- 1) indexed attributes (not including the mth attribute),
connected by an AND operation, then an IQS is hidden.
2) When a QE contains (m - 1) indexed attributes,
and the mth attribute is one of these (m - 1 ) attributes,
then an IQS could be released if the following two con-
ditions both hold: a) There are one or more BQS's, AND
b) Both the BQS's and IQS's have the same attribute value
at the mth level.
3) When a QE contains 1, 2, * . ,or (m - 2) indexed
attributes, meeting the conditions a) and b) above, then
an IQS could be released.
Suppose the tree in Fig. 2 is used, and k = 2. Then the
QS along the path "F -+ A -- 1931" in an IQS. The
following examples illustrate the difference between par-
tial suppression and cell suppression, and the meaning of
the second condition. Since the third condition is only an
extension of the second condition, examples are omitted.
Example 1 Illustrates the First Condition: When a
query with the QE of ((SEX = F) AND (DEPT = A)
AND (B-YEAR = 1931)) was requested for COUNT,
the size of the QS is 1. Therefore, it is an IQS and will
be suppressed under partial suppression just as for cell
suppression. Hence both partial suppression and cell
suppression provide the same level of security. However,
if the QE was changed to ((SEX- F) AND (DEPT =
A)), then the size of this QS is 18 (12 + 3 + 3), and 18
is released as the answer of the query under partial
suppression. In partial supression the IQS's grouped along
the path ((SEX = F) AND (DEPT = A) AND (B-YEAR
= 1931)) were suppressed according to condition 1). In
the case of cell suppression, result 19 is released, and this
is accurate.
When an intruder tries to deduce the sensitive infor-
mation of an IQS, he could simply submit a QE such as
((SEX = F) AND (DEPT = A) AND (B-YEAR < >
1931)). Using cell suppression and partial suppression,
the size of the QS is 18 for both methods. In the case of
cell suppression, the query must be suppressed. Other-
wise the information in an IQS will be disclosed by sub-
tracting 18 from 19. However, under partial suppression,
the QS could not be disclosed by using such an inference
since the final response is 0 (18-18);. Therefore cell
suppression is more restricted than partial suppression.
The main drawback of the "partial suppression" is lack
of precision. As an example, for a QE ((SEX = F) AND
(DEPT = A)), the cell suppression has an accurate an-
swer 19, while the partial suppression gives an inaccurate
answer 18. The error rate is 1/ 19. Therefore an error rate
limitation should be predefined for maintaining accuracy
in partial suppression. When suppressing an IQS will pro-
duce an error rate greater than the error rate limit, then
the query will be rejected just as cell suppression did; oth-
erwise the query will be released without having IQS in-
formation in the final result. Note that this error rate lim-
itation is dependent on the file size, the QS size, and the
tolerable error rate.
Example 2 Illustrates the Second Condition: Suppose a
query has the QE ((SEX = F) AND (B-YEAR -
1931)). This QE contains two indexed attributes: SEX
and B-YEAR. Here m 3, and the third indexed attribute
is B-YEAR. The QE contains an IQS and a BQS. The IQS
is along the path F A -4 1931, and the BQS is along
the path F -+ D 1931. Since both the IQS and the BQS
are indexed on the attribute B-YEAR and have the same
value of 1931, condition 2) is satisfied, and the IQS is not
suppressed. The final answer is 5, or the sum of two
BQS's (namelyF A -+ 1931 andF - D -+ 1931). As
readers can see, it will be very difficult to "guess" the
IQS since the final answer combines information from an
IQS and an SQS. The indexed attribute DEPARTMENT
was not specified in the query; hence including an IQS
into the final answer does reflect the semantic meaning of
condition 2).
If a tight restriction is required on partial suppression,
the subcondition 2)-a) could be modified from BQS's to
IQS's. With such a modification,, the security level is in-
creased at the expense of information leak. The following
example illustrates the point.
Example 3 Illustrates a High Restriction on Condition
2): Suppose a user knows the schema of a database, some
sensitive data, and a query is made to the database as in
example 2. Using this supplementary knowledge, the user
is able to derive the following partial tree..
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A/D M
1931 1931 1931
query-set-size: 1 4 1
Notice that the partial partition tree in the above has
two IQS's. The first IQS is along path "F -+ A 1931,"
and the other is along path "F -- M 1931."
Suppose a user asks four queries: The first has a QE1
of "F -+ 1931," the second has a QE2 of "F -- D
1931," the third has a QE3 of "F -+ A -+ 1931," and
the fourth has a QE4 of "F -+ M -+ 1931." The size of
these four QS's are 6, 4, 1, 1, respectively. Therefore,
the queries with QEl and QE2 could be released safely,
while queries with QE3 and QE4 should be suppressed.
Now suppose the partial partition tree contains only a
single IQS, as shown below:
F
AD
1931 1931
query-set-size: 1 4
In this case, the size of QS's for QE1 and QE2 are 5
and 4, respectively. The user could easily disclose the IQS
for QE3 by subtracting the QS for QE2 from the QS for
QE1, even if the QS for QE3 is restricted. Now, if sub-
condition 2)-a) is modified from BQS to IQS, then the size
of the QS's for QEl and QE2 are both 4. Therefore the
sensitive data along path "F A -+ 1931" could not be
disclosed by using QE2.
B. PRD Perturbation Method
The basic steps in PRD perturbation are 1) partitioning
the file into a number of basic BQS's, 2) sampling some
SQS's randomly before they are queried, and 3) perturb-
ing only the data in IQS's.
Conceptually, the first step is same as the first step in
partial suppression. The second step modifies Scheaffer's
[29] "stratified random sampling" method. In this ap-
proach, the random sample QS is formed from a BQS
whose size is greater than some predefined constant k, and
it is called "random basic query set" (RBQS). If the size
of a BQS is less than k, then a third step is used to perturb
the data within the IQS. In the method proposed by [29],
there is no k restriction, and data will be perturbed and
released without the concept of query-set-size control. The
random-sample-query control, proposed by Denning [14],
samples the data at query time. Therefore, a data incon-
sistency problem will occur. In this method, data are sam-
pled before the query. Thus the retrieved data will always
be consistent regardless of when a query is submitted, and
the computation time is also reduced.
SEX ---> F
DEPT --- > A
B-YEAR --->1931 1932 1934 1960
1 1 1
(query-set-size) 1 11 3 3
(SAL data) 15 140 50 50
Fig. 4. Sampled partial partition tree.
Although the data perturbation method proposed by
Beck [2] is used, the functions are different. Beck's
method does not have the query-set-size control tech-
nique, while this method uses query-set-size control to
classify a QS into either an SQS or an IQS, and pertur-
bation is only applied to the data in an IQS. Concerning
the perturbation time, this method takes less time than
Beck's when the size of a QS is large, since Beck's method
perturbs all data in a QS, while this method perturbs only
the data in an IQS.
Example 4: Assume that the user asks a query in the
form SUM (QE, SALARY) with QE of (SEX = F AND
DEPARTMENT = A). Using the PRD perturbation
method, the corresponding BQS's are first sampled by a
certain sampling rate, say 7 / 8. The partial partition tree
resulting from the sampling is shown in Fig. 4.
Since the BQS along the path F -+ A -- 1931 is an IQS,
the IQS should be perturbed by using function xi = yi +
v * [zl * (Yi - Yq) + z2]; where v = e when Iyi - YqI
< b, and v = 1 when -Yi Yq I > b. Here, we assume
b = 1,e =10, zi = 0.1, andz2 = 0.2.
With these data, the SALARY of the IQS was perturbed
from the true value 15 into 17.83. This result was com-
puted by the above function with values of: 15 + 10 *
[0.1 *( 15 - 14.16) + 0.2] = 17.84. The final result for
query SUM ((SEX = F AND DEPT = A), SALARY)
is 272.164 which was computed by [(17.84 + 140 + 50
+ 50)/18] * 19. The true value for this query should be
255. The error degree is (272.164 - 255)/255 = 0.067.
IV. EVALUATION FACTORS
To measure the strength of a control method fairly, three
factors are considered, namely, preparation cost, query
complexity, and security. Preparation cost consists of the
implementation cost for the inference method, the storage
cost, the cost for setting up a partition tree, and the cost
for selecting samples. The measurable unit for a prepa-
ration cost is in dollars. Query cost measures the com-
plexity of a query, and it contains the response time of a
statistical query and the degree of information leak, since
both of them are affected by the complexity of a QE. The
measurable units for a query cost are seconds for response
time and ratio for the degree of information leak. Finally,
the security cost evaluates the degree that a protection
method could survive under various attacks. Three attack
methods are selected: 1) small and large query set [21],
2) general tracker [13], [15], [30], and 3) error removal
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[14]. The measurable unit for security is error rate. The
higher an error rate is, the more difficult to "guess" the
accuracy of the disclosed sensitive information. There-
fore the level of security is proportional to the value of an
error rate. The simulation results shown in Section V were
obtained with the worst case statistical values.
A. Preparation Cost
To install an inference control method into a system,
we have to analyze the requirements, design a control
method, code the method, and perform testing. These four
steps are standard in developing a software [25]. In this
study, we only consider the cost for the last two steps
since they are easiest to be measured. For evaluation, the
cost of these two steps are further classified into the fol-
lowing four types:
1) Implementation Cost: This is the cost for coding and
testing. The following function and terms are used to
measure this cost.
Ic = (P + T) * S * R.
Ic Implementation cost (dollars).
P Coding time (hours).
T Testing time (hours).
S Salary per hour (dollars/hour).
R Expense rate (for some overhead).
2) Storage Cost: This is the cost to store raw data, in-
dex data, and executable tasks on a secondary storage de-
vice. The storage unit is assumed to be a disk block. The
function and terms used are:
Sc =(Tb + Db) * Bc.
Sc: Storage cost (dollars).
Th: The number of blocks occupied by the task.
Db: The number of blocks occupied by raw data and
indexes.
Bc: The storage cost per disk block (dollars/block).
3) Setup Cost for a Partition Tree: The cost for estab-
lishing a partition tree is:
Pc = Pt * Tc
where
Pc The cost for setting up a partition tree (dollars).
Pt Execution time to establish a partition tree (sec-
onds).
Tc Computation cost (dollars /s).
4) Sample Selection Cost: When PRD perturbation is
used to control the inference, some samples are randomly
selected from a QS. To measure this cost, we have the
following function and terms:
SSc = St * Tc.
SSc The 'Cost for selecting a sample (dollars).
St The computation time for selecting samples
from an QS (seconds).
Tc The computation cost (dollars/s).
B. Query Complexity
When a query becomes more complex, the response
time is increased, and the possibility of information leak
will be greater. In this section, the complexity of a query
is measured by Cardenas's four query conditions [4], [20].
A QE is a called a query condition (QC) by Cardenas. A
QC is a disjunction of some record conditions, and a rec-
ord condition is a conjunction of some item conditions,
and an item condition is a disjunction of some atomic con-
ditions. For example, a QE of [ (SEX = F) AND (DEPT
= A) ] + [ (SALARY > = 20) AND B YEAR = 1931]
is a query condition; and [(SE+- = F) AND (DEPT =
A)] is a record condition. (DEPT = A) OR (DEPT =
D) is an item condition; and (DEPT = A) is an atomic
condition. For abbreviation, these four conditions are
numbered with 1 for atomic condition, 2 for item condi-
tion, 3 for record condition, and 4 for query condition,
respectively. For each condition, the response time and
information leak are measured by the following function:
1) Response Time:
RT = (RT, + RT2 + RT3 + RT4)/4.
RT Average response time for a query.
RTi Average response time for a query with type i
query condition.
2) Information Leak: Inevitably, an inference control
method will have some information leak. In order to mea-
sure such a leak, the information leak is classified into 1)
degree of restriction and 2) error rate. Depending on the
characteristics of a control method, the information leak
may result from some restriction, error rate, or both. For
example, the information leak due to query-set-size con-
trol is only related to the restriction, and the information
leak due to PRD perturbation is only related to the error
rate, while the information leak due to partial suppression
is related to both the restriction and error rate. These two
factors are measured as follows:
a) The Degree of Restriction:
DR = (j#, DRi)/4
DRi = (- Ci,j/Ni,j)/m , for i = 1, 2, 3, 4
where
DR The average degree of restriction per query.
i The ith query condition.
DRi The average degree of restriction for a query hav-
ing the ith query condition
mi The number of distinct queries tested by using the
ith query condition.
Njj The size of a QS which is associated with the jth
query using the ith type query condition.
C1,j The restricted size of thejth query asked by using
the ith query condition.
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Example 5:
i = 4
ml= 38, m2 = 90, m3 = 107, m4 = 87
DR1 = 0
DR2 = 0
N3,1 = 109, N3,2 = 170, N3,3 = 106,
N3,4 = 214,
C3,1 = 1, C3,2 = 1, C3,3 = 2, C3,4 0,
DR3 = (1/109 + 1/170 + 2/106
+ 0/214 + * - *)/107
= 0.00064
DR4 = 0.00193
DR = (0 + 0 + 0.00064 + 0.00193)/4
= 0.00064
If there are 2000 tuples in the QS, the information leak
results from suppressing an average of 1.28 tuples.
b) The Degree of Error:
E= (Z Ei)/4
Lm(
Ei = E (Aij -
-J=l
i = 1, 2, 3, 4
S3,1 = 3136, S3,2 = 4581, S3,3 = 2626,
S3,4 = 5778, *
E3 = [(3149 -3136)/3149 + (4593 - 4581)/
4593 + - ]/107
= 0.00065
E4 = 0.00215
E = (0 + 0 + 0.00065 + 0.00215)/4
= 0.0007.
The above examples were taken using the partial suppres-
sion method.
C. Security
To measure the security level, we could see how much
compromise that a statistical database can tolerate under
various attacks. Three attack methods are used, namely,
1) small and large query set attack, 2) general tracker at-
tack, and 3) error removal attack. Linear system attack
[28], [33], due to lack of general equations and functional
relationships among tuples, is not used in the study. In
order to test the degree of compromise as much as possi-
ble, the size of an IQS is set to 1, query-set-size control
constant k is set to 2, and three attack methods are used.
The simulation results are listed in Section V.
1) Small and Large Query Set Attack: As indicated by
Jonge [21], the sensitive information obtained by either
COUNT ( QE, N) or MEAN ( QE, N) could be disclosed
by the following functions:
c(B) (M(B) - M(A + B)) - c(C) (M(C) - M(A + C))
M(A + B) - M(A + C)
(c(A) + c(B)) M(A + B) - c(B) M(B)
c(A)
where
E The average degree of error.
Ei The average degree of error produced by a query
having the ith type of query condition.
Aj,j The actual statistical result obtained by the jth
query with the ith type query condition.
sij The estimated result obtained under an inference
control method by the jth query with the ith
query condition.
Example 6:
i =4
mI = 38, m2 = 90, M3 = 107, m4 = 87
El= 0
E2 = 0
A3,1 = 3149, A3,2 = 4593, A3,3 =
A3,4 = 5778, *
if the following conditions are all satisfied:
i) A and B = 0, A and C = 0 ("and" means conjunc-
tion)
ii) A + B, A + C are responsive
iii) M(A + B) < > M(A + C)
and
iv) c(A) < k
where
A, B, C Qualification expression.
0 Empty set.
M MEAN statistics.
c (A) The size of a QS whose QE is A. It also equals
COUNT (A).
k The predefined constant for query-set-size
control.
Example 7:
k = 2.
A "SEX = M AND DEPT = A AND
B YEAR = 1944".
c(A) =
M(A) =
1334
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B "SEX = M AND DEPT = D".
C "SEX = M AND DEPT = M".
c(A) = COUNT(A).
M(A) = MEAN(A; SAL).
c(A) = 1.
M(A) = 33.93.
If the actual value of MEAN (A) is 29, then the error
rate is (33.93 - 29)/29 = 0.17. Semantically, this value
implies that an intruder may use the above two functions
to derive the sensitive information contained in the IQS,
even though c(A) is 1, which is less than k = 2. The
possibility that the disclosed sensitive information is
wrong is 0.17. In other words, an intruder may have 0.17
uncertainty about the rightness of the result.
2) General Tracker Attack: When security is tested by
using the general tracker attack method, the following
function, proposed by Denning [13], is used. To look for
a tracker, Denning's methods, proposed in [15], is used.
2k . c(T) < N - 2k
Q = q(T) + q(T')
If c(QE) < k, then q(QE)
= q(QE + T) + q(QE + T') -Q;
otherwise q(QE) = 2Q - q(QE' + T)
- q(QE' + T')
where
T
Tr
c(T)
N
k
q
QE
QE'
A general tracker.
The complement of T.
The size of the query set T.\
The size of the database.
The predefined constant.
The statistical function.
A given qualification expression.
The complement of QE.
Example 8: Suppose we have:
QE "SEX = M AND DEPT = A and
B YEAR = 1944".
QE' " -(SEX = M AND DEPT = A and
B_YEAR = 1944)".
T "SEX = M".
T' "SEX = F".
q AVG.
k 2.
N 2000.
c(T) = 981.
c(QE) = 1 <k.
AVG(QE) = AVG(QE + T) + AVG(QE + T7) -
Q
= 26.2122.
If the actual value of AVG ( QE ) is 29, then the error
rate is (29 - 26.2122)/29 = 0.097.
3) Error Removal Attack: This method, as proposed by
[14], utilizes the mutual exclusive subsets of a QS to guess
the sensitive data. For example, suppose a QS C contains
sensitive data, and C is a subset of another QS A. To de-
duce this sensitive data, we can first create a new subset
B = A - C, then compute the statistical results for sets
A and B by using the properties of mutual exclusive sub-
sets. If statistical results for A and B could be derived in
this way, then the sensitive data in C are obtained by usilng
the set difference C = A - B.
There are two possible ways to derive a subset from a
query set C. The first possibility is that C could be parti-
tioned into a number of mutual exclusive subsets. In this
case, we can derive the sensitive data by using the follow-
ing functions.
C-=[Si I ( Ci + C ) ] /nc.
C The query set which will be compromised.
C The estimation result under the attack method.
Cc The subset of C.
-Ci The complement of CiF(Ci = C- C,).
nc The number of subsets in C.
Example 9:
C "SEX = M".
C, "SEX = M AND DEPT = A".
C2 "SEX = M AND DEPT = D".
C6 "SEX = M AND DEPT = T".
C1 "(SEX M AND DEPT = D) + (SEX
=M AND DEPT = M)+ ** +
(SEX = M AND DEPT-T)'=
_C6 "(SEX = M AND DEPT = A) + (SEX
=M AND DEPT = D) + * +
(SEX = M AND DEPT = S)".
C [(C1+-Cl)+(C2+-C2)+*' +
(C6 + -C6)]/6.
SUM(C) = SUM(SEX = M; SAL) = 25756.
SUM(C) = 33482.
In this example, the error rate is (33482 -
25756)/25756 = 0.30. Semantically, this value implies
that an intruder may be able to derive sensitive data by
using the attack method; however the result has 0.30 pos-
sibility of inaccuracy.
The second possibility is that C itself is a BQS, there-
fore, it cannot be partitioned further. However, if C is a
subset of another QS A, then, the sensitive data in C could
be derived by using the following functions.
C = A - B.
A = [SIal (Ai + -Ai)]/na.
B = [EbI (Bi + -B,)]/nb.
B =A -C.
na The number of subsets in A.
nb The number of subsets in B.
Example 1O:
C "SEX = M AND DEPT = A AND
B_YEAR= 1944".
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TABLE I
EVALUATION RESULTS
Evaluation factors (units)
__________________________
1. preparation cost ($)
(1) implementation cost
(2) storage cost
(3) set-up cost for a
partition tree
(4) sample selection
cost
__________________________
Total ($)
__________________________
2. query complexity
(1) response time (sec.)
(2) the degree of inf.
leak (ratio)
(a) restriction degree
(b) error degree
3. security (ratio)
(1) small and large
query set
(2) general tracker
(3) error removal
s. metho p- mtoBeck's
method
1050
120
0
1170
49.7287
0.0
0.7112
(0.01387)
0.1:3
(0.1008)
0.079
8.177
2660
610
33
0
3303
8.6641
0.2030
0.0
0.1
(0. 01262)
0. 0796
NO*
3220
960
202
4382
_________
4.864
0. 00064
0.00067
NO*
NO*
I 0.5
Note : Notation * means that the attack method is useless
for the control method.
A "SEX = M".
B "(SEX = M) AND -(SEX = M AND
DEPT = A AND B YEAR =
1944)".
A "(SEX = M AND DEPT = A) +
-(SEX = M AND DEPT = A) +
(SEX = M AND DEPT = D) +
-(SEX = M AND DEPT = D) +
B "(SEX = M AND DEPT = D) +
(SEX = M AND DEPT = D) AND
-(SEX = M AND DEPT = A AND
B_YEAR = 1944) + (SEX = M
AND DEPT M) + (SEX M
AND DEPT = M) AND - (SEX = M
AND DEPT =A AND B_YEAR =
1944) + *
SUM(C) = SUM (A/6 -SUM(B/6)
= 52720.97 - 52714.18
= 6.79.
In this example, the error rate is (29 -6.79)/29 =
0.7658, and it is included in Table I.
V. EVALUATION RESULTS
The relation EMPLOYEE in Fig. 1 is used, and there
are N = 2000 tuples in this relation. For testing purposes,
there are 322 queries which are created randomly. Using
the Cardenas [4] query complexity, these 322 queries were
classified into four groups. There are 38 queries grouped
in atomic conditions, 90 queries in item conditions, 107
queries in record conditions, and 87 queries in query con-
ditions. SUM and COUNT are used as statistical func-
tions. The query-set-size control constant k is set to 2, and
the sampling rate is set to 7/8.
To find the strength and weakness of these two meth-
ods, each method is first compared to some existing
method whose concepts and functions are adapted in the
new methods. Then these two methods are compared with
each other. To evaluate partial suppression, Cox's meth-
ods [9] is used, since both methods are based on suppres-
sion. For evaluating PRD perturbation, Beck's method is
selected since the PRD perturbation uses Beck's princi-
ple, except that Beck's perturbation function is modified.
The evaluation results are summarized in Table I.
A. Comparison to Other Methods
Partial Suppression Against Cox's Method: As shown
in Table I, the preparation cost for Cox's method is 25
percent cheaper than for partial suppression. In the case
of query complexity, the response time of Cox's method
is only half as fast as partial suppression, and the restric-
tion degree is 300 times greater than that of partial
suppression, but the error degree is zero in Cox's method,
and 0.00067 in the partial suppression method.
To test security by using small and large query set at-
tack, partial suppression has no effect at all, but there is
0.1 probability that the sensitive data along the path "M
-+ A -+ 1944" will be' disclosed with an error rate of
0.01262 for Cox's method. In other words, the sensitive
data has one percent possibility to be disclosed with
0.01262 possibility that the disclosed result is wrong.
With attack by general tracker, the IQS protected by the
partial suppression has no possibility to be disclosed,
while an intruder could disclose the IQS protected by
Cox's method with a 0.0796 error rate. However there is
a 0.5 error rate for partial suppression against the "no"
effect for Cox's method when the attack is error removal.
In short, partial suppression is superior to Cox's method
under a small and large QS attack or a generaltracker, but
inferior to Cox's method under an error removal attack.
1336
partial Cox's
sup. method
---------I-----------
PRD
per.
.3150
870
2 0 2
1
4 1
--------
4 2 63
4 . 5 9 4
0. 0
0.02025
--------
0. 1
(O .17)
0 . 0 9 7
0 . 7 6 5 8
CHIN AND PENG: TWO NEW INFERENCE CONTROL METHODS
PRD Perturbation Against Beck's Method: Similarly,
the preparation cost for preparing Beck's method is 72.5
percent cheaper than PRD perturbation. In the case of
query complexity, the response time of Beck's method is
ten times slower than PRD perturbation. As for the re-
striction degree, both are zero. To perturb the SALARY
data and the QS data, the error degree in Beck's method
is 35 times greater than that of the PRD perturbation
method (0.7112/0.02025). If perturbation was only made
to SALARY data, then the error degree is 0.02025 for
PRD perturbation and 0.01387 for Beck's method.
To test security by using small and large query set at-
tack, the probability of disclosure and the associated error
rate are (0.1, 0.17) for PRD perturbation and (0.13,
0.1008) for Beck's method. With attack by general
tracker, the IQS protected by the PRD perturbation could
be disclosed with a 0.097 error rate, while Beck's method
has a 0.079 error rate. Hence PRD perturbation has a
higher security level than Beck's method under a small
and large QS attack or a general tracker attack. When the
attack method is error removal, Beck's method yields a
much higher error rate than that of PRD perturbation.
Therefore, Beck's method is more secure than PRD per-
turbation. In short, the PRD perturbation is superior to
Beck's method under a small and large QS attack or a
general tracker, but inferior to Beck's method under an
error removal attack.
To summarize, partial suppression is superior to the
Cox's method for query complexity and security, but in-
ferior in preparation cost and an error removal attack.
Similar conclusions could be drawn between PRD pertur-
bation and Beck's method.
B. Comparison Between these Two New Methods
As shown in Table I, the preparation cost is almost the
same for both methods. For query complexity, the aver-
age response time of the partial suppression method is, on
the average, 0.27 seconds slower than that of the PRD
perturbation method in an interactive environment; thus
insignificant. This result may have effects in a batch en-
vironment. In the degree of restriction, both methods have
similar results. For error degree, PRD perturbation is
nearly 30 times higher than partial suppression for the
functions SUM and COUNT. However, the error degree
for other statistical functions such as AVERAGE is lower.
As for security level, it was found that the partial
suppression method is far more secure than the PRD per-
turbation method. Using small and large QS methods to
attack the sensitive data SALARY, the PRD perturbation
method has 0.1 probability to disclose the size of an IQS
and 0.17 probability that the disclosed data was in error.
With attack by general tracker and error removal, the er-
ror rate is 0.097 and 0.7658, respectively, for PRD per-
turbation, and the error rate is zero and 0.5 respectively
for the partial suppression. In other words, the sensitive
data will not be disclosed under a general tracker attack,
but an intruder could guess the IQS with only 0.097 error
rate that the guess was wrong. With error removal attack,
the erorr rate is 0.7658 for PRD and 0.5 for partial
suppression; hence PRD is more secure than partial sup-
pression. If the security level of a user can be greater
than 0.10, the PRD perturbation method is a reasonable
method to use.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A good inference control method should have proper-
ties of high security level, small error rate on statistical
results, high efficiency, and low maintainance cost. The
simulation results indicate that the partial suppression
method is superior to PRD perturbation for the first two
properties, and inferior to PRD perturbation for the last
two properties.
To compare these two methods with those of Cox and
Beck, these two new methods have higher preparation
cost, faster response time, and better security.
Conceptually, a partition tree is based on classification.
If some statistical results are computed, and stored in ad-
vance as in PRD perturbation, then the performance could
be improved.
Two new methods are presented in this paper and eval-
uated by preparation cost, query complexity, and level of
security. Information leak is considered as a parameter in
the query complexity since the complexity level is di-
rectly related to degree of information leak. From the
evaluation results, it is concluded that there is no control
method superior to another method in every aspect. If high
security and low error rate are important, then a control
method based on restriction concept should be considered
first. Otherwise, a control method based on data pertur-
bation should be considered, since a perturbation method
has lower cost for preventing disclosure at the expense of
higher error rate, and less security than that of a restric-
tion method.
APPENDIX
Beck's method does not have the query-set-size control
technique, and all data in a QS have to be perturbed. In
this section, we first state a modified function. The mod-
ified function has a query-set-size control technique and
perturbs only the IQS data; hence the query response time
is reduced. We then show the partial suppression method
is safe under 1) the small and large query set attack method
or 2) the general tracker method.
A. Modifications on Beck's Function
The following functions are used for PRD purturbation:
Xi = Y, + v * [zl * (Yi - Yq) + z2]
where v = e when Yq | < b,
and v = 1 when Yi-Yq > b
j j
zl = 2I zl(i), z2 - Z z2(i)
E(z1(i)) = 0, V(zl(i)) = 2a2
E(z2(i)) = 0, V(z2(i)) = (2a2/nq)(Yq -Y) (a)
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E
V
Yi
xi
Expected value.
Variance.
Sensitive data.
Perturbed data from Yi.
Yq The average value of indexed attribute A in
RBQS's.
nfq The query set size.
z 1, z 2 Random variables.
a, b, j, e System parameters. During simulation, they
are set to 0.2, Yi/10, 4, 10, respectively.
Y The average value of indexed attribute A in
database.
If Yi is an extreme datum, and either (Yi - Yq) is ap-
proximately to zero or Yi equals Yq, then function (a) could
be used to protect the sensitive datum Yi.
B. The Small and Large Query Set Attack Method Is
Useless in the Case of Partial Suppression
Suppose A, B, and C are QE's, I A I < k and B ,IC
> k; then A is suppressed under partial suppression. In
other words, we have A + B = B and A + C = C. Using
the attack function [21], we have:
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